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THE EARLY ROBERTS COURT ATTACKS CONGRESS'S
POWER TO PROTECT CIVIL RIGHTS
ROCHELLE BOBROFF*

In its first two years, the Roberts Court decided numerous civil

rights cases,1 shifting the Court to the right of the previous, already
extremely conservative Rehnquist Court. 2 Virtually every civil rights
decision by the Roberts Court is justified as comporting with precedent and the clear language of statutes, regardless of the number of
cases overruled-explicitly or implicitly-and the abundance of
judges who have read the same statutory language and concluded it
had the opposite meaning.
While the decisions of the early Roberts Court are couched in legalistic, technical language, the impact of these cases is simple: the Court
has threatened the power of Congress to protect civil rights. The conservative3 bloc has rejected legislative intent, in some cases explicitly
choosing not to follow clear expressions of congressional will and in
other cases totally ignoring the question of congressional intent. Laws
that overrule decisions of the Rehnquist Court have been narrowly
construed by the majority, and numerous precedents that uphold civil
rights have been limited to their facts or rejected outright. The early
Roberts Court has abdicated its role to ensure that administrative interpretations of statutes comport with congressional intent, deferring
heavily to executive branch litigation positions that contradict statutory goals. The Court has belittled the expertise of judges and juries
to decide complex issues of law and fact, and a majority has explicitly
* Directing Attorney, Herbert Semmel Federal Rights Project, National Senior Citizens
Law Center. I thank Harper Jean Tobin for her excellent research assistance and comments. I
also gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions from Simon Lazarus, Timothy Jost, Steve
Hitov, Jennifer Mathis, and Len Becker.
1. In this article, I use the term "civil rights" broadly to include a wide range of laws that
are protective of individual rights.
2. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al; Robert Barnes, A Rightward Turn and Dissension Define Court This
Term, WASH. PosT, July 1, 2007, at A07; David Savage, High Court Has Entered a New Era, L.A.
TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al.
3. In this article, I use the terms "conservative" and "centrist" simply to distinguish two
groups of Justices who frequently voted together in civil rights cases. There is certainly room for
debate concerning whether these are the most accurate labels for the judicial alliances, but that
issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Others have referred to the divisions of the Justices as a
conservative/liberal split, and I have left those labels intact in quotations of their work.
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overruled cases that support the equitable power of the judiciary. The
conservative Justices have signaled that they will continue the Rehnquist Court's refusal to permit Congress to hold states accountable for
violating civil rights. Usurping the constitutional power of Congress,
the early Roberts Court has pursued a political agenda of eradicating
the protections of individual rights in civil rights statutes.
I.

THE REHNQUIST LEGACY

The hostility of Chief Justice Rehnquist to civil rights and safety net
statutes is renowned.4 Under his leadership, the Supreme Court's
conservative Justices used judicial power to thwart popular legislation
and, in essence, curtail the power of Congress to protect disadvantaged individuals.' Scholars have noted that, beginning in 1995, the

Rehnquist Court developed "a new judicial activism" in which "disrespect for Congress is a fundamental element." 6 In cases involving federal laws prohibiting discrimination based on race, sex, age, and

disabilities, the Rehnquist Court placed "democratic rights in jeopardy" by "denigrating the political process and refusing to protect racial minorities from the effects of prejudice." 7
A.

The Rehnquist Court's Attacks on Civil Rights Laws
Civil rights and other progressive laws were invalidated by the

Rehnquist Court on the basis that the statutes exceeded Congress's
constitutional power under the Commerce Clause. 8 The precedents
relied upon by the Court consisted largely of discredited cases from

the anti-New Deal Supreme Court in the early twentieth century. Jus-

tice Souter, dissenting on behalf of the Court's four centrist 9 Justices,
explained that the anti-New Deal Supreme Court's Commerce Clause

jurisprudence from 1887 to 1937 was repudiated in 1942, after which,
the Court respected Congress's broad power to regulate under the
4. See, e.g., Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.IP.? Did the Roberts Hearings Junk the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Revolution? 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2006); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court
Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court'sJurisprudence, 84 TEx. L. REv. 1097 (2006); Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to
Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537 (2003); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002).
5. In most of the Rehnquist Court cases discussed in this article, the "conservative" majority was composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas, while the "centrist" dissenters were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer.
6. Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 87 (2001).
7. Stephen M. Griffin, The Age of Marbury: JudicialReview in a Democracy of Rights, in
MARK TUSHNET (ED.), ARGUING MARBURY V. MADISON 104, 138-40, 145 (2005).
8. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun Free School Zones Act).
9. See supra note 5, explanation of the term "centrist."
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Commerce Clause for well over 50 years.'0 Nevertheless, in 1995, the
Rehnquist Court resurrected the anti-New Deal approach of striking
down rational congressional statutes on the ground that they exceeded
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, and utilizing this
approach, invalidated the Violence Against Women Act in 2000. The
Commerce Clause decisions of the Rehnquist Court exalt the power
of both the courts and the states.11
The Rehnquist Court further decreased congressional authority by
invalidating numerous federal statutory provisions that authorized aggrieved individuals to sue states. 12 While this diminution of congressional power was ostensibly based in the Eleventh Amendment, 3 the
Court admitted that the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not
support such a result.14 Instead, the majority justified its rejection of
federal legislation by pronouncing that "fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design" prohibit Congress from abrogating
states' sovereign immunity. 5 The Court held that these "implicit"
postulates conferred power on the states while the explicit grants of
power in the Constitution under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the
Indian Commerce Clause, 6 the Patent Clause,' 7 and Congress's general constitutional legislative power' 8 did not enable Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity and legislate in furtherance of
10. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 616-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 561 n.3. (The Rehnquist majority's approach is
often described as "federalism," though one commentator notes that opponents "repeatedly insist that the current defenders of states' rights are doing little to empower states and may, perversely, be restricting their authority in the name of protecting it." David J. Barron, Fighting
Federalism with Federalism:If It's Not Just a Battle Between Federalistsand Nationalists, What Is
It? 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2082 (2006).).

12. See David Krinsky, A Plan Revised: How the Congressional Power to Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity Has Expanded Since the Eleventh Amendment, 93 GEo. L.J. 2067, 2067-68
(2005) (summarizing cases).
13. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI.
14. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999) (dismissing textual arguments and stating
that "sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of
the original Constitution itself"); See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1204-10 (2001) (discussing the Amendment's text and arguing in detail that
"sovereign immunity cannot be justified under an originalist approach").
15. Alden, 527 U.S. at 729.
16. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (citing no authority under Interstate Commerce Clause and Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3). The Rehnquist
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe was a radical shift in the Court's approach, explicitly overruling the holding in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14-22 (1989), that Congress had
authority under the Commerce Clause to enact a statute abrogating sovereign immunity). See
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66 (declaring Union Gas "wrongly decided" and overruled).
17. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (citing no authority under either Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, or
Patent Clause, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.).
18. Alden, 527 U.S. at 730-54 (explaining why state sovereign immunity is "beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation").
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legitimate policy objectives. These sovereign immunity cases provide
a clear example of the Rehnquist Court majority not only diminishing
the constitutional power of Congress to protect civil rights, but also
tilting the balance of powers between the state and federal government set forth in the text of the Constitution.
Justice Rehnquist conceded, first as an Associate Justice and then
again after becoming Chief Justice, that the Fourteenth Amendment
enables Congress to empower individuals to sue states, expanding federal power at expense of states. 19 However, the Rehnquist Court
drastically restricted Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a stringent new test of "congruence and proportionality" for legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment.2" Applying the "congruence and proportionality" test
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,21 the Court held that the
legislation was "beyond congressional authority" under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
A favored approach of the Rehnquist Court to stymie legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment was to narrowly limit congressional power to enact effective remedies, such as damages or attorneys
fees. 23 For example, the conservative bloc ruled that Congress exceeded its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment when authorizing individuals to sue state employers under civil rights statutes for
24
employment discrimination damages based on age or disability.
Rather than utilizing the traditional test-whether Congress had acted
rationally in response to the problem of discrimination 25-the Rehn19. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing the holding in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.)).
20. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). The Court formulated the requirement that in order for legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to be valid there
"must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end."; See Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Revisits Sovereign Immunity in
DiscriminationCases, 42 TRIAL 70, 70 (2006).
21. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2007).
22. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
was not "appropriate" Fourteenth Amendment legislation, because the statute was too broad for
the goal of remedying constitutional violations).
23. See, e.g., David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1212-44 (2005) (SUMMARIZING THE REHNQUIST
COURT'S REMEDY-LIMITING DOCTRINES). See also, Buckhannon Bd. & Home Care, Inc. v. West
Virginia, 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (limiting congressional power to permit civil rights litigants to recover attorneys' fees in claims brought under the Fair Housing Act and Americans with Disabilities Act).
24. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
25. See, e.g,, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding prohibition on race discrimination in public accommodations where Congress had a "rational basis"
for believing a pattern of discrimination existed which could affect interstate commerce, and the
prohibition was a "reasonable" response to that pattern).
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quist Court posed the question of whether the states were rational in
discriminating against older persons and people with disabilities.26
The majority explicitly concluded that state discrimination against
older persons and people with disabilities is rational, 27 and then proceeded to invalidate remedies
that were not "proportional" to the "ra28
tional" discrimination.
The Rehnquist Court frequently devised arduous procedural hurdles to deprive individuals of the ability to bring civil rights suits. For
29
instance, the Court ruled in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,
that female employees must challenge a seniority system upon its
adoption and are time-barred from challenging the system when it
subsequently impacts their seniority in a discriminatory manner.3 °
For civil rights and safety net statutes clearly constitutional under
the Spending Clause of the Constitution, 31 the Rehnquist Court repeatedly held that aggrieved individuals had no right to enforce the
law, completely denying court access when states allegedly violated
federal law. In Suter v. Artist M. ,32 the Court held that foster children
did not have a cause of action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 33 to enforce
the requirement that the state use "reasonable efforts" to reunite
them with their families, because the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act phrased the "reasonable efforts" requirement as a provision of a state plan. Exalting form over substance, the Court opined
that Congress did not "unambiguously" express an intent to confer
enforceable rights on beneficiaries via § 1983 when these rights were
set forth as part of a state plan.34
In the early 1990s, Congress fought back against the Court's restrictive interpretation of civil rights and safety net statutes. In the 1991
Civil Rights Act, 35 Congress repudiated the holding of Lorance, clarifying that an unlawful employment practice occurs when a person is
subjected to a seniority system in a discriminatory manner, not when
26. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84.
27. See Samuel Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, The Americans with Disabilities Act, and
Rational Discrimination,55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 925 (2004).
28. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-86; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-68.
29. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 910-12 (1989).
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
32. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358 (1992).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
34. Id. at 363 ("The term 'reasonable efforts' in this context is at least as plausibly read to
impose only a rather generalized duty on the State, to be enforced not by private individuals, but
by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services]."). See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED

RESPONSE 95 (2003) ("All of the Social Security Act welfare programs, of course, require in the
first instance that the states have in place an approved plan so Suter had the potential of overruling all previous SSA cases.").
35. 105 Stat. 1079, codified as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2).
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the seniority system is first implemented.36 In interpreting another
provision of the 1991 Act, Justice Stevens noted that the Act was intended to override eight separate Supreme Court decisions, including
Lorance.3 Similarly, in 1994, Congress passed legislation disapprov-

ing the Court's analysis in Suter of congressional intent to confer enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.38 Congress specified in the

"Suter fix" legislation that a "provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its inclusion in a section of the [Social Security] Act
requiring a State plan or specifying the required contents of a State
plan. ,39
This congressional reproach was barely even acknowledged by the

majority of the Rehnquist Court. The statutes repudiating the Court's
interpretation of congressional intent were narrowly construed, and
the conservative Justices continued to utilize the same judicial approach and reasoning that led to the results rejected by Congress. Justice Stevens, dissenting, protested that the Rehnquist Court failed to

respond to the widespread rebuke of the Court in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act and that the Court had continued to adhere to "judgemade rules" that disregard congressional intent.4" Likewise, in cases
denying access to the courts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce Spend-

ing Clause statutes, the Court continued to rely upon Suter, without
mentioning that Congress rejected the reasoning in Suter when it
passed the Suter fix legislation.4

Rather than changing course, the

Court extended the reasoning in Suter, further narrowing the right of
individuals to enforce federal legislation, by continuing to infer that

Congress failed to "unambiguously" express its intent to create en-

forceable rights.4 2
In 1995, Republicans took control of Congress,4 3 and Congress
largely acquiesced in the Supreme Court's repudiation of congres-

36. Lorance, 490 U.S. 900, 918 (1989).
37. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994) (Rehnquist was the Chief Justice in seven of these cases and was in the majority in each of them). See also William Eskridge,
overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, App. I (1991).
38. Suter, 503 U.S. at 347.
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-2, 1320a-10 (identical provisions). See JOST, supra, n. 34 at 95
("Congress confirmed first, its intent to provide a private remedy under § 1983 to Medicaid
recipients and providers and, second, its belief that it had already done so.").
40. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 212 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 281 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,
342 (1997).
42. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283, 290. See also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89
(2001) (holding that congressional intent to create a private right of action in a statute must be
clearly indicated by "rights-creating" language).
43. See, e.g., Evan Thomas, Decline and Fall, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 2006; http://www.news
week.com/id/44579; Andrea Stone, Republican Revolution Fades, USA TODAY, Jan. 19, 2003,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-01-19-gop-revolution-usatx.htm
(examining the "Republican Revolution" from the perspective of subsequent events).
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sional power to protect civil rights."

237

The Republican Senate con-

firmed numerous judicial nominees in the ensuing years who
concurred in the Rehnquist Court's hostility to civil rights.4 5
B.

The Roberts and Alito Confirmation Hearings Sought the
Nominees' Views of Rehnquist Court Civil Rights Cases

In 2006, Chief Justice Rehnquist passed away and John Roberts was
nominated to replace him. Just prior to Roberts's nomination hearings, Republican Judiciary Committee Chair Arlen Specter released

two letters criticizing the Rehnquist Court for usurping congressional
power, denigrating congressional competence, and rejecting congressional findings based on overwhelming evidence.4 6 At the hearings,
four Democratic and three Republican Senators questioned Roberts,

emphasizing the importance of judicial respect for Congress. 4 7 In response, Roberts attempted to placate the Senators by questioning the

precedential force of some of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence
and suggesting that courts should be careful not to usurp the legislative role by reweighing congressional findings.4 8
Shortly afterward, the Senate considered the nomination of Samuel
Alito to replace Justice O'Connor, who was retiring and had been a

swing vote in favor of the protection of individual rights in some
cases. 49 In response to questions similar to those posed to Justice
Roberts by Senate Judiciary Committee members, Alito declined to

offer any criticism of the Rehnquist Court's decisions.50

44. One exception is that Congress responded to the Supreme Court's 1997 invalidation of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, as applied to state and local governments, in
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Congress passed a much more limited statute, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the narrow 2000 statute as applied to state treatment of prisoners. Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
45. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson & Bill Hing, The Immigrant Right Marches and the Prospects
for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 130-32 (2007) (discussing
some high-profile examples); and see generally ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE: JUDICIAL SELECTION

(2007), http://www.afj.org/assets/resources/publications/s6
report.pdf.
46. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 10-11.
47. Id. at 11.
48. Id. at 20.
49. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (sex discrimination);
Tennessee v. Lane. 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (Americans with Disabilities Act); Nevada Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (Family Medical Leave Act); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914 (2000) ("partial-birth" abortion).
50. Lazarus, supra note 4, at 29.
DURING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
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In 2007, the Democrats took control of both houses of Congress for
the first time in twelve years,51 setting the stage for potential conflict
with the Court's diminution of congressional power.
II.

THE EARLY ROBERTS COURT INTENSIFIED THE JUDICIAL
ASSAULT ON CONGRESS'S POWER TO PROTECT

CIVIL RIGHTS

Despite the ruminations of Justice Roberts during his confirmation
hearings, the early decisions of the Roberts Court have perpetuated
and amplified the judicial attack on congressional efforts to protect
civil rights. The Court has diminished the power of Congress, the
most representative of the three branches of government, and expanded the power of the judicial and executive branches as well as
state governments.
A.

CongressionalIntent Expressed in Legislative History and
Statutory Goals has been Rejected; Instead, the Roberts
Court Relied upon Cases Congress Explicitly
Overruled

Following the lead of the Rehnquist Court, a majority of the early
Roberts Court has assaulted congressional power to enact effective
remedies in civil rights legislation. In two decisions, both written by
Justice Alito on behalf of the five more conservative Justices, the majority chose to disregard congressional intent to protect civil rights,
holding Congress to a standard of rigorous clarity and excruciating
detail that has no basis in the Constitution.
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy5 2

presented the issue of whether expert fees are covered by the costshifting provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)." Like many civil rights and safety net statutes, the IDEA
conditions funding for the states on compliance with federal directives
and was enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the Spending
Clause of the Constitution.54 Justice Alito acknowledged that the legislative history clearly expressed congressional intent that the costshifting provision cover expert fees, but the Court put "the legislative
history aside."'55 The majority justified its disregard of legislative history as protective of the rights of states. The Court declared, "In a
51. Robin Toner & Kate Zernike, For Incoming Democrats, Populism Trumps Ideology,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, § 1.
52. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 2 (2006).
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
54. Arlington, 548 U.S. at 295 (citing U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
55. Arlington, 548 U.S. at 304.
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Spending Clause case, the key is not what a majority of the Members
of both Houses intend but what the States are clearly told regarding
the conditions that go along with the acceptance of those funds."5 6
The Court suggested that it would provide more weight to legislative
history for other statutes, but indicated that it would not follow congressional intent expressed in legislative history for civil rights and
safety net laws enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause.5 7
This decision did not cite any constitutional provision that supports
such a disregard of the legislative history of civil rights laws, and indeed there is no text in the Constitution that would support the
Court's derogation of congressional power and dismissal of congressional intent for Spending Clause statutes. Naturally, the Roberts
Court cited cases from the Rehnquist Court era to support its decision, primarily the Pennhurst decision written by Rehnquist when he
was an Associate Justice 58 as well as two other cases from Rehnquist's
tenure as Chief Justice: the Crawfordcase authored by Rehnquist and
the Casey decision written by Justice Scalia.5 9 The Casey decision was
overruled by Congress in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.6 ° Thus, the Roberts Court added insult to injury in its disrespect for congressional intent by relying on a case that Congress had superseded by statute.
The Arlington decision reveals that Justice Roberts's Senate testimony
professing his readiness to defer to the will of Congress6 1 was
disingenuous.
Justice Breyer's dissent in the Arlington case (on behalf of the four
centrist Justices) noted initially that the majority opinion was contrary
to the clearly expressed intent of Congress.6 2 He pointed out that the
Arlington decision went beyond the bounds of Pennhurst in reducing
congressional power under the Spending Clause. He explained:
[N]either Pennhurst nor any other case suggests that every spending
detail of a Spending Clause statute must be spelled out with unusual
clarity. To the contrary, we have held that Pennhurst's requirement
that Congress "unambiguously" set out "a condition on the grant of
setting forth
federal money" does not necessarily apply to legislation
' 63
"the remedies available against a noncomplying State. ,
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
59. Crawford Fitting Co. v. JT Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987); W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc.
v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991)).
60. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
61. See Lazarus, supra, note 4, at 22.
62. Arlington, 548 U.A. at 308 (Breyer, J.,dissenting) (Stevens & Souter, JJ., joining dissent; Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and in result).
63. Id. at 317 (emphasis in original) (citing Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790, n.17

(1983)).
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Justice Breyer's dissent highlights the new heights to which the Roberts Court has taken the judicial denigration of congressional power:
requiring extraordinary specificity and detail in the statutory text of
civil rights statutes.
A second, equally egregious example of the Roberts Court majority
disregarding congressional intent is Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co, Inc.' Lilly Ledbetter was an area manager at Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., a position largely occupied by men. Initially, she
received a comparable salary to men performing similar work. However, over time, due largely to poor performance evaluations, her salary fell substantially below that of every male manager.6 5 After she
retired, she sued the company, alleging that her poor evaluations resulted from sex discrimination and affected her pay throughout her
employment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.66
Her case went to trial, and the jury ruled in her favor, awarding substantial damages. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that a Title
VII pay discrimination claim cannot be based on any pay decision
prior to the EEOC charging period of 180 days. The Supreme Court,
in a 5:4 decision written by Justice Alito, affirmed.67
The majority rejected Ledbetter's contention that "discriminatory
acts that occurred prior to the charging period had continuing effects
during that period. '' 68 Instead, the Court ruled that the "a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent
non-discriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from past
discrimination. '69 Justice Alito's decision asserted that Ledbetter's
arguments were "squarely foreclosed by our precedents."7
The precedents relied upon by the majority were the Lorance case which Congress superseded in the 1991 Civil Rights Act 71 - and two
cases which were cited in the overturned Lorance case as the basis for
its holding.7 2 Justice Alito's decision limited the applicability of the
Lorance legislative fix to the exact facts of the Lorance case, which
involved a seniority system based on intentional sex discrimination.
The Court held that the legislative fix did not apply to any other type
of employment discrimination, including Ledbetter's claims of dispa64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
(1977),

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
Id. at 2165-6.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2007).
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2165.
Id. at 2167.
Id.
Id. at 2169.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2).
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167-69 (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553
and Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980)).
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rate treatment.7 3 Justice Alito stated that since the cases relied upon
by Lorance were not explicitly rejected by Congress in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, the Court was justified in basing its decision upon the reasoning in Lorance and the cases that led to the result in Lorance.7 4
The Court ignored the obvious fact that the reasoning in Lorance led
to a holding that Congress repudiated. Instead, the Court narrowly
construed the Lorance legislative fix, rejecting the dissent's observation that the 1991 Civil Rights Act demonstrated Congress's conclusion that Lorance was wrongly decided.7 5
The majority similarly rejected Ledbetter's argument that pay raise
issues should be treated differently from other employment discrimination claims, due to their continuing effects. The Court distinguished
Bazemore v. Friday, in which Justice Brennan, concurring, stated that
"[e]ach week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless
of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of
Title VII." 76 The majority treated Bazemore exactly as it treated the
Lorance legislative fix: limiting Bazemore to its facts. The Court
noted the factual differences between Ledbetter's claims of disparate
treatment and the explicit racial discrimination in Bazemore and then
concluded that, "Bazemore is of no help to her."7 7 Any precedent
that supported Ledbetter's case was rejected by the majority on the
grounds of having different facts, while contrary precedents, superseded by statute, formed the basis for the majority's decision.
Justice Ginsburg authored a passionate dissent, which she read from
the bench.7 8 The dissent argued that a pay discrimination claim is like
a hostile work environment, because both types of claims are based on
the cumulative effect of individual acts.7 9 Justice Ginsburg relied
upon the Lorance legislative fix and Bazemore and stressed that the
majority's interpretation of Title VII "strayed from ... fidelity to the
Act's core purpose."8 Justice Alito characterized the dissent as
"coy," for not acknowledging that under the dissent's approach, an
employee could wait 20 years before bringing an EEOC charge based
on a single discriminatory pay decision. 8 1 In response, the dissent replied that such a suit would be barred by the equitable defense of
73. Id. at 2169.
74. Id. at 2169 n.2.
75. Id. at 2183-84 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986).
77. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2174.
78. Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, THE WASH. POST, May
30, 2007, at A01.
79. Ledbetter, 127 S.Ct. at 2180 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2175.
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laches.8 2 Incredibly, the majority justified its result by claiming to defer to the will of Congress as expressed by the filing timeframes in the
Civil Rights Act,83 regardless of the intent of Congress as codified in
the Lorance legislative fix. The Court professed to be bound by a
statutory filing deadline while ignoring the purpose of the legislation
and the explicit congressional rebuke of the Court's prior reasoning.
Statutes enacted specifically to supersede Supreme Court precedent
clearly express congressional intent and therefore ought to guide future cases.84 The Court should not follow the reasoning of a congressionally-reversed decision where doing so would lead to a very similar
result, especially when, as in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, "Congress
made clear . . . its view that [the] Court had unduly contracted the
scope of protection" the statute provides.8 5 The Court upsets the constitutional balance of power when it defies statutes that overturn judicial decisions and continues to rely upon cases superseded by statute.
B.

Judicial Deference to the FederalExecutive Branch has
Undermined Congressional Intent in Civil Rights Laws

The Roberts Court has also diminished congressional power by ignoring congressional intent and deferring heavily to the interpretation
of statutes by the executive branch. The Court has increased the level
of deference accorded to federal agencies, deferring not only to regulations promulgated with public comment but also to mere expressions of agency opinion in legal briefs. The Court's deference to
federal administrative agencies' interpretation of federal law has
united the centrist and conservative members of the Court. The 2007
Supreme Court term included two unanimous decisions, one written
by Justice Breyer and the other by Justice Scalia, emphasizing deference to administrative agency interpretations of law.8 6
In Long Island Care at Home,87 a domestic worker sued her former
employer alleging that the employer failed to pay her the minimum
wages and overtime wages to which she was entitled under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).8 8 The FLSA exempts from its coverage
domestic service employees who provide companionship services, and
82. Id. at 2186 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2176 n.8.
84. Statutes that supersede judicial opinions are not retroactive, unless Congress specifies
retroactive application. Rivers v. Roadway Exp. Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 305 (1994). The Court also
stated in dicta that a "legislative response does not necessarily indicate that Congress viewed [a
statutory] decision as 'wrongly decided' as an interpretive matter." Id.
85. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
86. Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310, 2317 (2007) (Scalia, J.); Long Island Care at
Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 2350-51 (2007) (Breyer, J.).
87. Long Island Care at Home, 127 S. Ct. at 2350-51.
88. Id.
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the statute explicitly calls upon the Secretary of Labor to promulgate
regulations to define the terms contained within the statutory exemption.8 9 The Department of Labor (DOL) had issued two contradictory regulations regarding whether a worker providing companionship
services who is employed by an agency, not the family, is covered
under the Act. The first regulation, in a subpart entitled "General
Regulations," defines "domestic service employment" as services for
the person by whom he or she is employed.90 The second DOL regulation, located in a subsection entitled "Interpretations," defines companionship workers to include those who "are employed by an
employer or agency other than the family or household using their
services."" The Court referred to the second regulation as the "thirdparty regulation." The district court dismissed the suit based on the
third-party regulation, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that
the third-party regulation was "unenforceable." 9 2 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Second Circuit.9 3
Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court is highly deferential to the
agency's interpretation of its own regulations for litigation purposes.
The worker argued that the third-party regulation conflicts with the
definition of domestic service employment in the General Regulations. The Court admitted that "the literal language of the two regulations conflict as to whether workers paid by third parties are included
within the statutory exemption." 94 However, the Court held that the
third-party regulation governs, stating that "the specific governs the
general." 95 The Court also conceded "that the Department may have
interpreted these regulations differently at different times," but found
that the "interpretive changes create no unfair surprise" since the
DOL utilized notice-and-comment rulemaking.9 6 The Court further
"concede[d] ... that the Department set forth its most recent interpretation of these regulations in an 'Advisory Memorandum' issued only
to internal Department personnel and which the Department appears
to have written in response to this litigation." 97 Nevertheless, the
Court found that DOL's interpretation "reflects its considered views"
and was not plainly erroneous. 98
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15).
29 C.F.R. § 552.3.
29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a).
Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 462 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2006).
Long Island, 127 S.Ct. at 2352.
Id. at 2348.
Id.
Id. at 2349.
Id.
Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that the
third-party regulation was entitled to limited deference-due largely
to the agency's inconsistency in its position-and further held that the
regulation was contrary to the purpose of the law.9 9 The Supreme
Court was unconcerned with the inconsistency in the agency's position, finding the latest explanation of the agency's position to be "reasonable."'1 ° The Court was also unconvinced by the purpose of the
law, focusing on the power of the administrative agency to interpret
ambiguities in the statute. 1 ° ' The Court rejected the Second Circuit's
holding that a court should review the interpretive regulation for its
persuasiveness under the less deferential standard of Skidmore v.
Swift & Co." 2 Instead, the Court found that the third-party regulation was entitled to full deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NatuDefense Council, Inc., °3 and United States v. Mead
ral Resources
10 4
Corp.
The Court stated that "where the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority, and where the rule itself is reasonable, then a
court ordinarily assumes that Congress intended it to defer to the
agency's determination."1 5 The Court utilized a highly deferential
standard for reviewing agency positions, instructing lower courts to
generally "assume" that Congress intended deference. Thus, even
though the agency issued contradictory regulations and interpreted
the regulations inconsistently over time-culminating in an agency interpretation articulated solely for purposes of litigation-the Court
gave full deference to the most recent agency interpretation.
The unanimous opinion in Beck v. PACE InternationalUnion °6 was
equally deferential to the federal executive. Crown Paper Company
filed for bankruptcy and sought to liquidate its assets. Because Crown
Paper had overfunded some of its pension plans, the purchase of an
annuity would allow the company to reap a $5 million reversion in
surplus funds. PACE International Union proposed instead that
Crown Paper merge its pension plans with other PACE pension plans.
PACE's proposal would not permit the $5 million reversion. Crown
Paper rejected the union's proposal and purchased the annuity.
PACE sued, alleging that Crown Paper breached its fiduciary duties
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER99. Coke v. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 376 F.3d 118, 133 (2d Cir. 2004).
100. Long Island, 127 S.Ct. at 2350-51.
101. See id. at 2339.
102. Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
103. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Long Island,
127 S. Ct. 2339.
104. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
105. Long Island, 127 S.Ct. at 2350-51.
106. Beck v. PACE Int'l Union, 127 S. Ct. 2310.
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ISA) by neglecting to give diligent consideration to PACE's merger
proposal.10 7 The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the union and issued
a preliminary injunction preventing Crown Paper from obtaining the
$5 million reversion. The District Court and Ninth Circuit affirmed.1" 8 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
While the Ninth Circuit based its decision upon the ERISA statute
and implementing regulations which supported the union's position," 9
the Supreme Court based its decision on deference to the opinion of
the federal government, as expressed in the government's brief and
agency opinion letters." 0 Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court agreed that the statutory text was ambiguous. The Ninth Circuit found that the statute and regulations did not prohibit merger.
The Supreme Court deferred to the opinion of the agency expressed
in its brief-not its regulations-that merger was impermissible under
the statute. The decision, written by Justice Scalia, put the burden on
the union to prove that the agency's interpretation was "unreasonable.""' The Court acknowledged that portions of the statutory
scheme were consistent with the union's position, but the Court concluded that the statute lacked the "clarity needed to disregard the
[agency's] considered views.""' 2 Since the statute did not explicitly
permit mergers, the Court found that the agency's interpretation was
"permissible" and "plausible."'1 3 The Court indicated that, unless
Congress explicitly indicates that the agency has limited discretion, the
courts should give wide latitude to the agency's position, even if articulated only for purposes of litigation.
These cases are notable for broadening the scope of deference to
federal agencies to the extent that the will of Congress is ignored.
When statutes are ambiguous, it is the proper role of courts to look to
the legislative history, purpose of the statute, overall structure of the
statute, etc., to attempt to discern congressional intent."' The Court's
assumption that an agency position articulated solely for litigation
purposes, even when contrary to the purpose of the statute, is valid, is
an abdication of judicial responsibility to scrutinize agency action for
107. Id. at 2314-16.
108. Beck v. Pace Int'l Union, 427 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2005).
109. Id.
110. Beck, 127 S. Ct. at 2317 n.4.
111. Id. at 2318.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2320.
114. See, e.g., Chevron,, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (1984) ("The judiciary is the final authority on
issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary
to clear congressional intent.").
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its adherence to congressional intent. 5 The Court's broad deference
to agency litigating positions enlarges the power of the executive
branch and erodes congressional power to protect civil rights.
C.

Denying Judicial Access, the Court Ignored CongressionalIntent,
with Some Exceptions

Several cases decided by the early Roberts Court have addressed
the threshold question of whether injured parties have any right to
bring their claims in court. The Roberts Court has not hesitated to
deny judicial access to enforce civil rights, ignoring clear expressions
of congressional intent while blaming Congress for the resulting inequities. Nevertheless, one decision by Justice Kennedy proclaimed the
injustice of denying access to judicial remedies and two other cases
unanimously upheld the rights of prisoners to bring suits.
1. The Roberts Court has denigrated the competence of the
judiciary and undercut the equitable and remedial
powers of courts in denying court access
The degree to which the early Roberts Court disallowed access to
the courts to vindicate individual rights, portends increased difficulty
for enforcing civil rights. The Court has evinced utter disregard for
the right of aggrieved parties to have their day in court.
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing involved two class ac-

tion antitrust suits brought by sixty investors against ten leading investment banks." 6 The investors challenged the banks' underwriting
practices during the initial public offering of shares in a company, alleging that the underwriters colluded to require investors to pay anticompetitive charges. The complaints attacked underwriter efforts to
obtain excessive commissions through practices disapproved by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)." 7

Before the Second Circuit, 8 the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in support of the investors, and
the SEC submitted a letter that did not support the industry." 9 The
Second Circuit put the burden of showing that Congress intended to
115. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) ("We have never
applied the principle [of agency deference] to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.").
116. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007). While this case is not a
traditional "civil rights" case, the issue involved access to the courts to vindicate the rights of
consumers and provides important insights into the approach of the early Roberts Court.
117. Id. at 2393-94.
118. Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Ltd., 426 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005).
119. Id. at 136, 168.
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implicitly repeal the antitrust laws on the industry.120 The Second Circuit found that there was "no legislative history indicating that Congress intended to immunize" the anti-competitive arrangements at
issue in the litigation. 121 The Court of Appeals further held that the
did not conflict with any specific provision of the securiantitrust laws
122
ties laws.
The Supreme Court did not address the question of whether Congress intended the securities laws to repeal the antitrust laws. Indeed,
the Court ignored the issue of whether the legislature intended to immunize anti-competitive arrangements from suit by injured parties.
The decision, written by Justice Breyer on behalf of six Justices, focused instead on the "efficient functioning of the securities market"
and cautioned that investor suits posed "a substantial risk of injury to
the securities markets.' 1 23 The Supreme Court noted that the securities laws grant the SEC authority to supervise all the activities chal2 4
lenged in the litigation and the SEC does regulate the activities.'
Since the SEC actively enforces its rules and regulations, the Court
saw a "diminished need for antitrust enforcement to address anticompetitive conduct.' 25 In contrast to the Second Circuit's conclusion
that no provision of the antitrust laws at issue in the case conflicted
with the securities laws, the Supreme Court found "a serious conflict
laws and, on the
between, on the one hand, application of the antitrust
1 26
other, proper enforcement of the securities law.'
Even though the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division had
supported the investors before the Second Circuit, when the case
moved to the Supreme Court, the SEC filed a brief in support of the
industry's petition for certiorari. 127 After certiorari was granted, the
Solicitor General filed a brief on the merits in support of the2 8banks,
urging a remand to the district court for further fact finding.
The opinion by Justice Breyer justifies the decision to close the
courthouse doors to investors on the grounds that judges and juries do
not have sufficient expertise to determine the factual and legal questions at issue in such litigation. The Court stated:
[AIntitrust plaintiffs may bring lawsuits throughout the Nation in dozens of different courts with different nonexpert judges and different
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 169-70.
Credit Suisse, 127 S.Ct. at 2396-97.
Id. at 2397.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2397, 2389.
Id. at 2386, 2397.
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nonexpert juries. ... The result is an unusually high risk that different
129
courts will evaluate similar factual circumstances differently.
The Court concluded rhetorically that only the SEC had sufficient expertise to determine
whether an underwriter engaged in conduct that
130
violated the law.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the result, stated that in his opinion
13 1
the challenged conduct did not rise to a violation of antitrust law.
However, he did not join Justice Breyer's opinion, specifically objecting to its disparagement of the expertise of the courts. 1 32 Justice
Kennedy recused himself, because his son is a managing director of
Credit Suisse. 133 Chief Justice Roberts recused himself initially based
on his financial interests in some of the defendant firms, but then he
34
re-entered the case without explanation just before oral argument.
Justice Thomas, dissenting alone, noted that the Securities Act had
a savings clause that preserved rights and remedies outside the securities law, and therefore viewed the securities law as permitting the lawsuit under the antitrust law.1 35 While the majority rejected this
contention, because the savings clause did not explicitly mention the
antitrust law, 36 Justice Thomas stated:
Although Congress may have singled out antitrust remedies for special treatment in some statutes, it is not precluded from using more
general saving provisions that encompass antitrust and other remedies. Surely Congress is not required to enumerate every cause of action-state and federal-that may be brought. When Congress wants
to
37
preserve all other remedies, using the word "all" is sufficient.1
In this case, Justice Thomas, standing alone, defended the constitutional duty of the courts to uphold the will of Congress and the rights
of civil rights litigants.
It is disturbing that Justice Breyer and the five members of the
Court who joined his opinion, gutted investors' rights under antitrust
law without even considering whether Congress intended in the securities law to implicitly immunize the banking industry from suits under
the antitrust law. While agencies are certainly entitled to some measure of deference in interpreting ambiguous statutes, the Court's re129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 2394.
Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. 2383.
Id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Id.
Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Grants Banks Broad Implied Immunity for Antitrust Law-

suits, LEGAL

TIMES,

(Jun. 19, 2007), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=118215754

3778.
134.

Id.

135. Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2392.
137. Id. at 2399.
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view of congressional intent was too cursory and its deference to the
agency interpretation was too expansive. As a result, the Court abdicated its proper role of ensuring that agency interpretation of law
comports with Congress's intent to preserve legal remedies.
Even more troubling, the Court belittled the intellectual abilities of
judges and juries to decide complex issues of fact and law. The
Court's denigration of judges and juries as "nonexpert," undermines
the constitutional duty of the judiciary to enforce complicated statutes. The possibility that the reasoning138in this decision could be extended to other contexts is distressing.
While members of the Court's centrist wing were willing to close
the courthouse doors in Credit Suisse, the Court split along the typical
conservative/centrist divide in the context of the appeal rights of a
prisoner, in Bowles v. Russell.1 39 The Court's five conservative members were united in their fervor for closing court access to prisoners,
denying any right of appeal when a prisoner missed a filing deadline
due to the inadvertent error of the district court judge.
In granting an extension for filing a federal habeas appeal, the district court judge in Bowles mistakenly gave the defendant seventeen
days to file, but the statute and implementing federal rules permit
only fourteen days. 4 ° The prisoner's appeal was filed by his attorney
on the sixteenth day. 41 The Sixth Circuit refused to hear the appeal,
holding that the notice of appeal was untimely. The Supreme Court
affirmed, ruling 5:4 that a court has no142power to give an equitable
exception to filing deadlines for appeal.
The majority began with the general rule that the 14-day time limit
is "mandatory and jurisdictional.' 1 43 The Court held that a filing
deadline contained in a statute, as distinguished from a filing deadline
based on a rule of procedure but not a law, cannot be extended as part
of the equitable power of the judiciary. Once again blaming Congress,
the conservative bloc declared that the judicial branch does not have
"authority" from the language of the statute to grant equitable relief
when a statutory filing deadline is missed. 4 4 The majority claimed to
be bound by the will of Congress, suggesting that any possible inequitable result from the Court's "rigorous" application of statutory time
138. See Mauro, supra note 133.
139. Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 2107; Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(6).
141. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362.
142. Id.
143. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2363 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S.
56, 61 (1981)).
144. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366.
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limits was due to congressional drafting.14 5 The Court stated that
Congress could explicitly authorize the courts to "excuse compliance
with the statutory time limits."1'46 In this manner, the Roberts Court
placed a new burden on Congress to confer upon the courts the power
to interpret statutory deadlines in an equitable fashion.
Far from upholding precedent, the majority in Bowles invalidated
prior Supreme Court decisions that recognized the equitable role of
courts. The Court expressly overruled two prior cases from 1962 that
established the judicial doctrine of "unique circumstances," which permits the equitable extension of time to prevent great hardship to a
party. 14 7 The majority stated that the "unique circumstances" doctrine is "illegitimate" because, "this Court has no authority to create
equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements."14' 8 The case cites
no basis in the Constitution for its holding that the judiciary is bereft
of such equitable powers. Instead, the Court focused on "a century's
worth of precedent and practice" that denied the right to appeal when
the notice of appeal is untimely.14 9 The majority dismissed the possibility of a narrow exception to the general rule of timeliness to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Justice Souter, dissenting on behalf of the Court's four centrist Justices, responded that there was "not even a technical justification" for
the majority's decision. 5 ° The dissent noted that the majority opinion
conflicts with substantial precedent permitting an exception to filing
deadlines in limited circumstances, including when a litigant relies
upon the instructions of a district court judge.15 t Souter's dissent also
points out the majority's disregard of statements regarding jurisdiction
in numerous recent and unanimous Supreme Court decisions-including two written by Justice Ginsburg. 152 Those recent cases held that
unless Congress expressly provides that a time limit may not be
waived, courts have the power to exercise equitable discretion. The
dissent protested:
In ruling that Bowles cannot depend on the word of a District Court
Judge, the Court demonstrates that no one may depend on the recent,
repeated, and unanimous statements of all participating Justices of this
145. Id. at 2367.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2366 (overruling Harris Truck Lines v. Cherry Meat Packers, 371 U.S. 215 (1962),
and Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964)).
148. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366.
149. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2364 n.2.
150. Id. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2369 (referring to Harris Truck Lines, 371 U.S. 215 (1962) and Thompson, 375
U.S. 384 (1964)).
152. Bowles at 2369-70. In response, Justice Thomas characterized the Court's recent pronouncements as "dicta." Id. at 2363-64 n.2.
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Court. Yet more incongruously, all of these pronouncements by the
Court, along with two of our cases [that were explicitly overruled], are
jettisoned in a ruling for which the leading justification is stare
decisis

53

The dissent 154
described the majority's treatment of Bowles as
"intolerable."
The Bowles decision is worded in legal terminology regarding the
nuances behind the meaning of "jurisdiction"-certainly not an issue
that galvanizes the public. Even the legal media, while recognizing
that the case reflects "the sharp conservative-liberal divide" of the
'
early Roberts Court, characterized Bowles as a "low-profile case." 155
Yet, it is important to recognize that, utilizing abstract legal language, the Court impaired the important constitutional role of the judiciary to effectuate justice. Once again, the Court placed a burden of
elaborate detail and specificity on Congress, requiring that each and
every statute delineate precisely the extent to which it may be interpreted equitably. There is no basis in the Constitution for the abdication of the judicial role in ensuring equity.
While the five conservative Justices were completely united in
Bowles, they could agree only on the result-closing access to the
courts for civil rights-in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation.'56 Justice Kennedy refused to join the other four in disapproving
the result in Flast v. Cohen,1 57 a 1968 case which held that a taxpayer
has standing to challenge a law authorizing the use of federal funds on
the basis that it violates the Establishment Clause. Still, Kennedy was
willing to join with Justices Roberts and Alito in limiting Flast to its
facts and charging Congress with policing the resulting injustice. Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurring only in the result, lampooned the
plurality for refusing to overrule Flast explicitly and blasted the dissenters for adhering to Flast.158 Justice Souter authored the dissent on
behalf of the Court's four centrist Justices-Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Alito and joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, noted that Flastinvolved a challenge to a statute, while Hein involved an Establishment Clause chal153. Id. at 2370.
154. Id. at 2367.
155. Tony Mauro, Low-Profile Supreme Court Case Offers Glimpse of Sharp Divide, LEGAL
TIMES (Jun. 15, 2007), http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=1181811943722.
156. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007). Hein does not involve
an interpretation of congressional intent, but rather concerns constitutional requirements for
standing. Still, the Hein case provides important clues about the early Roberts Court's view of
the role of Congress.
157. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
158. Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2582-84 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
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lenge to the actions of the executive branch. In Hein, the plaintiffs
challenged the discretionary expenditure of general executive branch
funds that was not the subject of any specific congressional action or
appropriation. Once this factual distinction was drawn, the plurality
simply held that Flast was not controlling and should not be extended
159
to executive action.
The plurality criticized Flast for giving "too little weight" to "serious
separation-of-powers concerns," but the plurality expressed adherence "to the doctrine of stare decisis" and refused to overrule Flast in
the absence of a case or controversy regarding the factual basis of
Flast.6 ° The plurality's main concern was that the judiciary not infringe upon the power of the executive branch.1 6 ' The plurality
viewed the independence of the executive from judicial
review as inte62
gral to the constitutional separation of powers.1
The plurality acknowledged the plaintiffs' argument that without
court review, the executive branch was free to violate the Establishment Clause, for instance by using discretionary funds to build' 63a
church or hire a clergy and "send them out to spread their faith.'
Unconcerned, the plurality stated that if such an "unlikely event...
did take place, Congress could quickly step in.' 1 64 Thus, the plurality
found that the courts did not have any role in preventing the establishment of religion by the executive branch in its disbursement of discretionary funds; instead, the plurality viewed enforcement of the
Constitution in this context as a congressional role, without specifying
how Congress could invalidate an executive action.
Although Justice Kennedy joined the whole of Justice Alito's opinion, he disagreed with the rest of the majority regarding Flast and expressed the view that Flastwas correctly decided. 1 65 The reluctance of
Justices Roberts and Alito to join Scalia and Thomas in overruling
Flast was likely intended to garner Kennedy's vote. Kennedy opined
in his individual concurrence that it was proper to permit taxpayer
standing to challenge a statute, but he viewed a challenge to the executive branch as improper. His concurrence concludes with the following observation:
159. Id. at 2568-69 (plurality opinion).
160. Id. at 2569-72.
161. See id. at 2569.
162. See id. at 2570.
163. Id. at 2571.
164. Id. at 2571. The plurality also stated that the taxpayers did not prove that there would
be any other basis for standing if the executive branch were to engage in such "improbable
abuses." This is an absurd burden to place on the plaintiffs who were arguing that taxpayer
standing is appropriate in such circumstances.
165. Id. at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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It must be remembered that, even where parties have no standing to
sue, members of the Legislative and Executive Branches are not excused from making constitutional determinations in the regular course
of their duties. Government officials must make a conscious decision
to obey the Constitution whether or not their acts can be challenged in
a court of law and
then must conform their actions to these principled
166
determinations.
In this manner, Kennedy admonished the legislative and executive
branches to obey the law, even when their actions cannot be challenged in court.
The dissent argued that there is no substantive difference between
the spending of tax funds in accordance with a statute and the expenditures of discretionary funds by the executive branch.' 67 The dissent
explained: "When executive agencies spend identifiable sums of tax
money for religious purposes, no less than when Congress authorizes
the same thing, taxpayers suffer injury.' 1 68 The dissent was clearly
looking to sway Justice Kennedy in the future by highlighting his
agreement that Flast was correctly decided, stating: "Flast speaks for
this Court's recognition (shared by a majority of the Court today) that
when the Government spends money for religious purposes a taxpayer's injury is serious and concrete enough to be 'judicially cognizable." ' 1 69 The dissenters disputed the majority's characterization of
precedent and suggested 70that taxpayer standing in Hein would be consistent with prior cases.'
Hein is notable for the acknowledgement in the plurality opinion
and Kennedy's concurrence that the Court's decision regarding taxpayer standing insulated the executive branch's support for religion
from judicial review. In this case, the judiciary abdicated its role to
ensure that the executive branch complies with the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution. Under the most basic principles of the
separation of powers in the American system of government, it is the
role of the courts, as well as of the Congress, to declare when executive action violates the Constitution. 7 1 Justice Kennedy's directive
that the executive must obey constitutional provisions even in the ab166. Id. at 2573.
167. See id. at 2584-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2585.
169. Id. at 2588.
170. Id. at 2584-89.
171. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (noting that absence of
effective judicial review of unconstitutional executive branch action "would subvert the very
foundation of all written constitutions"). See also Suzanna Sherry, The Intellectual Background
of Marbury v. Madison, in TusHNEr, supra note 7, at 45, 57 (Marbury "established that the
Executive Branch was subject to judicial oversight" and thereby restrained "any tendency toward an imperial presidency.").
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sence of judicial oversight cannot seriously be expected to restrain the
executive branch.172
2. The Roberts Court Has Permitted Some Civil Rights
Litigation to Proceed
Despite the Roberts Court majority's limitation on access to judicial
remedies in Credit Suisse, Hein, and Bowles, conservative Justices

have upheld the right to access the courts in a few civil rights cases.
Justice Kennedy authored an opinion in Winkelman v. Parma City
School District declaring the injustice of denying court access. 173 Justices Roberts and Alito joined Kennedy's decision, along with the four
centrist Justices.' 7 1 Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part. 75
The Winkelman case concerned the right of parents to litigate pro se
on behalf of their children under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 7 6 The local school district had recommended
placement of the parents' autistic son in a public elementary school. 77

The parents disagreed with that placement and paid for their son to
attend a private school. The parents appealed the school's decision
through the administrative process and lost. 1 78 They then filed suit
pro se in the district court and lost. They appealed pro se to the Sixth
Circuit. The Sixth Circuit dismissed their appeal without considering
the merits, holding that the rights conferred by the IDEA belong to
the child, and therefore non-lawyer parents could not pursue an appeal pro se.' 79 The Sixth Circuit's ruling conflicted with a decision of
the First Circuit. i80
The Supreme Court began by noting that because the school district
accepts federal funds to pay for the education of children with disabilities, "it must comply with IDEA's mandates."'' Given the Court's
derogation of congressional powers under the Spending Clause in
cases such as Arlington Central School District Bd. of Educ. v. Mur172. See TUSHNET, supra n. 7, at 7-8 (suggesting that if each branch of government is entitled
to make and act on its own independent judgment of what the Constitution means then getting
the President to follow the court's position "might be difficult").
173. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2007-10 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
176. Winkelman, 127 S.Ct. 1994 (referring to Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of
2004, § 611, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2007)).
177. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 1998.
178. Id. at 1998.
179. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 150 F. App'x 406 (6th Cir. 2005).
180. See Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247 (1st Cir. 2003).
181. Winkelman, 127 S.Ct. at 1998.
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phy,'82 it is helpful to have the Roberts Court acknowledge its role in
enforcing a statute enacted pursuant to Congress's power under the
Spending Clause.
Indeed, the State relied upon the Arlington case, arguing that the
IDEA did not provide "clear notice" of the state's liability, as required for Spending Clause statutes. 183 The Court rejected the State's
contention that permitting the parents to proceed pro se would place
"any substantive condition or obligation" on the states.18 4 The Court
stated that the "basic measure of monetary recovery ... is not expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and
the child."' 8 5
The Court also dismissed the State's assertion that states would be
subjected to frivolous suits and increased litigation costs, if parents are
permitted to represent themselves.186 The Court responded: "Effects
such as these do not suffice to invoke the concerns under the Spending Clause." '8 7 The Court noted that the IDEA permits states to seek
attorneys' fees from losing parents,18 8 and therefore concluded that
the impact on state treasuries would be minimal.1 8 9 The Court's assessment that the costs to the states in Winkelman would be insubstantial contrasts sharply with the Arlington case, in which the parents
sought close to $30,000 to reimburse the costs of an expert.1 90 The
Court's appraisal of the minimal fees involved in Winkelman could
have influenced some conservative Justices to depart from the tenor
and tone of Arlington.
Furthermore, in Winkelman, the Court relied heavily on the wording of the purpose of the IDEA, which includes ensuring "that the
rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected."1 9' The Court observed that the "grammatical structure
would make no sense" if the IDEA did not confer independent rights
on parents. 192 The Court found that other provisions presume "parents have rights of their own," and any contrary interpretation would
be "far too strained to be correct."'19 3 The Court cited case law from
182. See Arlington, 548 U.S. at 29 (holding that Spending Clause legislation must provide
clear notice of spending conditions).
183. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 1997.
184. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2006.
185. Id. at 2006.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2002 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2005)).
189. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2006.
190. Arlington, 548 U.S. 29 2458.
191. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2002 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (2005)).
192. Winkelman, 127 S. Ct. at 2002.
193. Id. at 2002-03.
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the 1920s for the proposition that "parents have a recognized legal
interest in the education and upbringing of their children." 194
Winkelman contains a very helpful formulation of the connection
between rights and remedies. The dissent by Justices Scalia and
Thomas argued that if there is a right without a remedy, "that complaint is properly addressed to Congress."' 195 The other seven Justices
rejected that pronouncement. Justice Kennedy's opinion responded
that the dissent's approach of not permitting parents to appeal pro se
the school placement of the child, "leaves some parents without'196a
remedy," in which case the "potential for injustice ... is apparent.
While devoid of any similar recognition of the injustice of depriving
parties of a remedy, the unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice
Roberts in Jones v. Bock 97 upheld access to the courts for prisoners.
The Supreme Court reversed a Sixth Circuit decision that placed judicial roadblocks on the filing of prisoner litigation above and beyond
statutory provisions and federal rules. The Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PLRA) 9 8 established new, additional requirements for
exhaustion of administrative remedies and quick review of the sufficiency of prisoners' claims prior to the filing of an answer.' 99 The
Sixth Circuit went above and beyond the PLRA and the usual rules
for the sufficiency of a complaint in dismissing prisoner litigation in
three separate cases.2 °° The Supreme Court stated that the Sixth Circuit's decisions were based on policy considerations that fell outside
the bounds of the proper judicial role. 20 '
The primary procedural issue addressed by the Supreme Court was
whether the complaint must plead and prove that administrative remedies had been exhausted. 0 2 The prisoner, Jones, had in fact exhausted his administrative remedies, but he did not attach copies of
the grievance forms to the complaint or describe the proceedings with
specificity. 203 The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit's dismissal was unwarranted. 2 4 The Court acknowledged that the PLRA was
intended to reduce prisoner litigation by making exhaustion
194. Id. at 2003 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923)).
195. Winkelman, 127 S.Ct. at 2011 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
196. Winkelman, 127 S.Ct. at 2005.
197. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
198. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C.).
199. Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 914.
200. See Jones v. Bock, 135 F. App'x 837 (6th Cir. 2005); Walton v. Bouchard, 136 F. App'x
846 (6th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Overton, 136 F. App'x 859 (6th Cir. 2005).
201. Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 914.
202. Id. at 915.
203. Id. at 917.
204. Id. at 923.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol30/iss2/9

26

Bobroff: The Early Roberts Court Attacks Congress's Power to Protect Civil

20081

THE EARLY ROBERTS COURT ATTACKS

mandatory, but the Court agreed with the majority of circuit courts
that prisoners simply had to include a short and plain statement of the
claim in the complaint, as required by the federal rules.2 °5 The Court
stated: "The PLRA itself is not a source of a prisoner's claim; claims
covered by the PLRA are typically brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which does not require exhaustion at all." 20°6 The Court explained
that the usual practice is to treat exhaustion as an affirmative defense
and not a heightened pleading standard. The Court emphasized that
"courts should generally not depart from the usual practice under the
Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns., 20 7 The
Court refused to imply this heightened standard based on other procedural requirements in the PLRA, noting that "when Congress meant
to depart 2 0from
the usual procedural requirements, it did so
8
expressly.
The Court found that the imposition of a pleading requirement
"cannot fairly be viewed as an interpretation of the PLRA," and cited
Justice Frankfurter for the proposition that "the judge's job is to construe the statute-not to make it better. ' 2 9 In this manner, the Court
adhered to the will of Congress in permitting access to the courts.
Similarly, in a unanimous decision written by Justice Scalia, the
Roberts Court permitted a prisoner to sue a state for damages under
the Americans with Disabilities Act for alleged discrimination based
on disabilities, but the decision is devoid of any expression of general
support for court access.2 1 0 Since the case concerned the issue of state
sovereign immunity, it will be discussed in detail in Section D.
In sum, there is possible ambivalence on the Roberts Court toward
restricting the right to sue in some cases, at least during the tenure of
Justice Kennedy. This underscores the importance of carefully selecting civil rights cases to be presented to the Roberts Court, to maximize the potential for a positive outcome.
D. Early Indications Suggest that the Roberts Court Majority Will
Adhere to the Reduction of Congressional Power to Protect
Civil Rights that have been Violated by the States
After Chief Justice Roberts's appointment, but before the arrival of
Justice Alito, the Supreme Court issued two decisions addressing state
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
COLUM.
210.

Id. at. 919.
Id. (citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982)).
Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 919.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 921 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
L. REv. 527, 533 (1947)).
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006).
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sovereign immunity in civil rights suits. 21 1 Although Justice Alito has
not joined an opinion directly addressing the issue of state sovereign
immunity in the context of civil rights, his opinion in Arlington Central
School District (narrowly construing Congress's power over the states
under the Spending Clause) 212 suggests that he joins the other conservative Justices' views on the power of states in the constitutional
design.
While Chief Justice Rehnquist had been the primary architect and
author of the expansion of state sovereign immunity,2 13 the Rehnquist
Court's final two Eleventh Amendment rulings in civil rights cases
both limited the sovereign immunity doctrine.2 1 4 The first case, Tennessee v. Lane, hinged on Justice O'Connor leaving the conservative
block and joining the opinion of the centrist wing. With O'Connor's
vote in a 5:4 split, the Court held that Congress had the power to
permit suits against the state to enforce Title II of the ADA.215 The
vigorous dissents by the other four members of the Rehnquist Court
conservative bloc indicate no retrenchment from previous sovereign
immunity decisions.2 16 Yet, in the second Rehnquist Court case narrowing sovereign immunity, Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v.

Hood, Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy and O'Connor sided with the centrist wing. The Hood case held that a bankruptcy proceeding to discharge a student debt was an in rem proceeding and was not a suit
against the state for the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment.217
Only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.218
The question of sovereign immunity in the context of bankruptcy
reemerged in the first months of Chief Justice Roberts's tenure. Central Virginia Community College v. Katz presented the question of

whether a bankruptcy proceeding to set aside preferential transfers
that the debtor had made to state agencies was barred by sovereign
immunity.21 9 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy sided with
Justices Scalia and Thomas, finding that the state was immune from
211. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541
U.S. 440 (2004).

212. Arlington, 548 U.S. 291.
213. See Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). (In each of these cases, Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer emphatically dissented.).
214. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
215. Lane, 541 U.S. at 513-14. Justice O'Connor was probably influenced by the compelling
facts in this case, involving a paraplegic man who refused to crawl up the stairs of a courthouse
that did not have an elevator and therefore was jailed for failing to appear in court.
216. Lane, 541 U.S. at 538.
217. Hood, 541 U.S. at 446-47.
218. Id. at 455-56.
219. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
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such a suit. 22° Thus, Justice Kennedy signaled that his vote in Hood
was intended to carve out a narrow exception without retrenching on
earlier sovereign immunity decisions.22 ' Yet, due to the swing vote of
Justice O'Connor, who joined the four centrist Justices, the conservative bloc did not prevail.22 2
The majority opinion by Justice Stevens and the dissent by Justice
Thomas vigorously debated the intent of the framers of the Constitution in enacting the Bankruptcy Clause.2 2 3 The majority found that
the states had acquiesced to subordinating their sovereign immunity
by ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause.2 24 Justice Stevens rejected the
state's argument that the text of the Clause contained no such subordination, stating: "text aside, the Framers, in adopting the Bankruptcy
Clause, plainly intended to give Congress the power to redress the
rampant injustice resulting from States' refusal to respect one another's discharge orders. '225 Justice Stevens concluded that Congress
had the constitutional power under the Bankruptcy Clause to subject
the states to bankruptcy suits, and therefore the abrogation of state
sovereign immunity was "effected in the plan of the [Constitutional]
Convention, not by statute. '226 The majority opinion in Katz relied
heavily upon and extended the ruling in Hood. The majority focused
on the congressional power to achieve a "uniform" bankruptcy system, which would include suits nationwide against state entities.22 7
Like many of the Roberts Court cases rejecting precedent without
expressly overruling it, Justice Thomas's dissent sought to eradicate
Hood on the basis of a factual distinction. While Hood involved property in the hands of the debtor, Katz involved property in the possession of the state.2 28 Justice Thomas found this factual distinction
sufficient to obliterate any effect of the Hood decision.2 29 The dissent
opined that a uniform system could treat different creditors differently, so that states would enjoy a protection from suit that did not
apply to other creditors.2 3 ° The dissent also disputed the majority's
characterization of the Bankruptcy Clause as abrogating sovereign immunity, focusing on the text of the clause and the Rehnquist Court's
220. Id. at 379.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 358.
223. Id. at 358, 379.
224. Id. at 356-57.
225. Id. at 377.
226. Id. at 379.
227. See id. at 366-69 (discussing the difficulties created by "the uncoordinated actions of
multiple sovereigns" in the early United States).
228. Id. at 391-92.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 385.
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sovereign immunity decisions regarding other portions of Article I of
the Constitution. 231 The dissent argued that there is "nothing special
about the Bankruptcy Clause" that would distinguish it from the rest
of Article I in abrogating sovereign immunity.2 32 The dissent concluded: "Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution
indicates that the Bankruptcy Clause, in contrast to all of the other
I, manifests the States' consent to be sued by
provisions of Article
233
private citizens.
Since the Katz decision was based on the swing vote of Justice
O'Connor, it is doubtful that there are presently five votes to adhere
to the decision's reasoning.2 3 4 Justice Thomas's dissent is likely to
portend the approach of the majority in future cases, in which Justice
Alito will replace Justice O'Connor. The Katz dissent was unconcerned with the power of Congress to effectuate justice through a national bankruptcy system. The dissent's primary, if not exclusive,
interest was whether there was an explicit agreement on the part of
the state to being sued. Once again, the conservative members of the
Roberts Court sought to impede congressional power to protect disadvantaged individuals when state entities conflict with individual rights.
In contrast to the clash of opinions in Katz, the second sovereign
immunity case involving Chief Justice Roberts and Justice O'Connor,
United States v. Georgia, unified the Justices in limiting the scope of
sovereign immunity. This case involved a prisoner suing for violations
of the ADA. 23 5 A paraplegic prison inmate alleged that he was confined in a cell too small to move his wheelchair for 23 hours per day,
denied needed assistance to use the shower and toilet, denied medical
treatment and physical therapy, and denied access to all prison programs due to his disability. 23 6 The Court unanimously upheld the abrogation of sovereign immunity for the prisoner's suit for damages, in
a narrow opinion authored by Justice Scalia.
The decision held that Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity
under the ADA for conduct sufficiently outrageous to violate the
Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 237 The
231. Id. at 381-82.
232. Id. at 382.
233. Id. at 393.
234. The conservative bloc of the Roberts Court has already refused to follow a number of
decisions that hinged upon the swing vote of Justice O'Connor. See Ronald Dworkin, The Supreme Court Phalanx, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Vol. 54, No. 14 (Sept. 27, 2007). Compare Gonzales v.
Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007); with Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003).
235. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151.
236. Id. at 155.
237. Id. at 158-59.
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decision sidestepped the central question of whether Congress could
validly abrogate sovereign immunity for discrimination that did not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The Court remanded
that issue to the lower court.2 38
Justice Scalia noted that the Eleventh Circuit had held that the prisoner alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and usual punishment, and the state did not challenge the appellate court's characterization of the complaint.2 3 9 Scalia's opinion attempts to distinguish a long line of cases in which the conservative
members of the Court upheld sovereign immunity by claiming that
none of the previous cases involved allegations of constitutional violations.240 That characterization is incorrect. In fact, constitutional violations had been alleged in Lane,24 1 but the conservative members of
the Court opined in dissent, as cited by Scalia, that the constitutional
allegations were baseless.2 42 Thus, it appears that United States v.
Georgia was the only civil rights sovereign immunity case in which
Justice Scalia and like-minded Justices believed that the constitutional
allegations were credible.24 3
After the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that there
were allegations of constitutional violations, it dismissed the prisoner's
damages claims based on its holding in a separate case that Congress
could not abrogate sovereign immunity under the ADA for violations
of the Eighth Amendment.2 4 4 Justice Scalia wrote that "no one
doubts" Congress has the power to abrogate sovereign immunity and
permit suits for damages under Title II when states violate the Constitution, 2 4 5-even though the judges of the Eleventh Circuit had come
to the opposite conclusion. Justice Scalia's characterization notwithstanding, United States v. Georgia significantly expanded the circum238. Id. at 159.
239. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 157.
240. Id. at 157-58 (discussing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)); Nevada Dep't of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
241. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-23, 533 (Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens' opinion in Lane emphasized
that the case involved allegations of constitutional violations. The Sixth Circuit decision in Lane
similarly noted that the plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations and the state disputed that
allegation. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 2003).
242. Lane, 541 U.S. at 538.
243. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent disputed the credibility of the allegations of constitutional violations in Lane, 541 U.S. at 543 n.4.
244. As the Supreme Court acknowledged, United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 156, the
Eleventh Circuit's decision was predicated on the separate Eleventh Circuit case of Miller v.
King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004), which rejected claims for damages against state officials
under the ADA for Eighth Amendment violations. Id. at 1275.
245. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158.
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stances under which suits against the states for damages under the
ADA may proceed. 46
Justice Scalia's opinion cites the majority decision in Lane only
once, followed immediately by two citations to the separate dissents of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in Lane.24 7 He cites the
majority opinion in Lane only for the proposition that there have been
prior disputes among "Members of the Court" on the sovereign immunity issue.24 8 In this manner, the opinion by Justice Scalia did not
embrace the majority opinion in Lane and suggested that in future
cases the conservative bloc may follow the Lane dissents.
Justice Stevens wrote a brief concurrence, joined by Justice Ginsburg, citing the majority opinion in Lane seven times and exhorting
lower courts to apply the approach utilized by the majority in Lane. 4 9
Justice Stevens suggested that under the reasoning of Lane, Congress
could properly permit suits against the states for damages based on
conduct "not limited to violations of the Eighth Amendment," including "the abridgment of religious liberties, undue censorship, interference with access to the judicial process, and procedural due process
violations. "250
Following Lane and United States v. Georgia, some scholars ex-

pressed "hope that the pendulum is beginning to swing back in the
2 51
direction of those elected by the people of the United States.
However, with the replacement of Justice O'Connor by Justice Alito,
the future appears less hopeful. Justice Scalia's opinion in United
States v. Georgiaciting the dissents in Lane makes it clear that, despite
the result, he is not backing down from the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence attacking congressional power to enable individuals to sue
states. This viewpoint gives states subordinate to the federal government more power than foreign governments to evade suit in American courts.252 Based solely on the conservative Justices' vision of
246. Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Revisits Sovereign Immunity in Discrimination Cases, 42
TRIAL 70, 71-72 (2006).

247. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 162 (Stevens, J.,concurring). In recent ADA cases, the approach of Lane has
been followed in most lower court cases that do not involve employment discrimination, although the Garrettmethodology has been applied by lower courts in employment discrimination
cases. Rochelle Bobroff, Scorched Earth and Fertile Ground: The Landscape of Suits Against the
States to Enforce the ADA, 2007 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 298, 300.

250. Id. at 162.
251. Anthony Kovalchick, Judicial Usurpation of Legislative Power: Why Congress Must
Reassert Its Power to Determine What is "Appropriate Legislation" to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 49, 104 (2006). See also William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power
After Tennessee v. Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 86 (2004) (characterizing Lane as "an important,
yet an incremental, step toward a more expansive Section 5 power").
252. In Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, 127 S. Ct.
2352 (2007), the Roberts Court broadly construed an ambiguous exception to the Foreign Sover-
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"fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design, ''2 53 the

conservative bloc's approach to sovereign immunity remains an affront to Congress's explicit powers in the Constitution.
III.

THE RESTRICTION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER BY THE
ROBERTS COURT IS A POLICY JUDGMENT INTRUDING
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
OF CONGRESS

By undercutting congressional power and ignoring congressional intent in civil rights cases, the majority of the early Roberts Court (following the lead of the majority of the Rehnquist Court) failed to fulfill
the constitutional judicial role of interpreting the law. Instead, the
conservative bloc of the Roberts Court assumed an inappropriate policy-making role, refusing to enforce laws that protect civil rights.
Certainly, all of the Justices are influenced by their political viewpoints. 4 Still, the constitutional role of the court is to enforce laws,
regardless of individual politics. The decisions of the conservative Justices, ignoring or overruling precedent and distorting plain meaning,

demonstrate that the Roberts Court majority is willing to act as a political policy-maker to achieve conservative social objectives. The
Court's opinions can only be understood as a cohesive whole by acknowledging that the Roberts Court is actively working to promote a
policy agenda that is overtly hostile to civil rights.

The activism of the early Roberts Court is clear. As one scholar
assessing the Roberts Court observed of its first term:
The Court moved significantly to the right on key issues that divide
liberals and conservatives-in particular, abortion and race. The
Court tended to favor the government over individuals across a wide

range of issues. And the Court tended to favor businesses over employees and consumers.2 55

eign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4), as congressional authorization to bring suit against
foreign governments. In contrast, the Rehnquist Court held that Congress must explicitly,
clearly, and unequivocally express its intention to abrogate the sovereign immunity of states,
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). Even when Congress articulates its
intention to abrogate sovereign immunity unambiguously, the Rehnquist Court has refused to
permit suits against the states. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) and
cases cited supra at notes 23-7. Under this approach, less specificity is required of Congress to
breach the sovereign immunity of a foreign country than a state within the United States.
253. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999). See discussion supra at note 13.
254. See CAsS R.
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130 ("[Jludges appointed by Republican presidents are systematically different, in their voting behavior, from
judges appointed by Democratic presidents.").
255. Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 423, 424 (2007).
See also, Simon Lazarus, The Most Activist Court, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Jun. 29, 2007), available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the most-activist-court.
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Another scholar has described the conservative bloc as a "right-wing
phalanx ... guided by no judicial or political principle at all, but only
by partisan, cultural, and perhaps religious allegiance. "256
The cases already discussed in this article demonstrate the manner
in which the Roberts Court assumed a policy role in negating congressional intent and denying access to judicial remedies. The Court similarly pursued partisan objectives in deciding cases involving the
interpretation of the Constitution.
One of the most high-profile cases of the early Roberts Court concerned the voluntary desegregation of public elementary schools. In
Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1,2 57 the conservative bloc invalidated the school student assignment
plans of Seattle and Louisville on the basis that the consideration of
race violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court distinguished
but did not explicitly overrule Grutter v. Bollinger,2 5 8 which had
reached the opposite conclusion in the context of higher education.
Grutter had been a 5:4 decision that hinged on the vote of Justice
O'Connor. The majority decision written by Chief Justice Roberts in
Parents Involved stated that the Court accepts the compelling government interest in diversity in higher education, but not elementary education, 259 narrowly limiting Grutter to its precise facts without
overturning the prior case. The acceptance of the need for diversity in
higher education, coupled with the rejection of the value of diversity
in elementary school education "is the kind of distinction-unrelated
to any difference in principle-that first-year law students are taught
to disdain. 2 6 ° The Roberts Court majority refused to accept the policy decision of city government and read into the Constitution its own
policy decision that racial preference as part of an integration plan is
undesirable.2 6 1
2 62 the Court
In another highly publicized case, Gonzales v. Carhart,
eroded women's right to choose an abortion, upholding the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.263 The Court ignored the holding in
26 4
Stenberg v. Carhart,
another case decided by the swing vote of Justice O'Connor, that abortion statutes are unconstitutional if they do
not contain an exception for the preservation of the health of the
mother. The majority decision demonstrated utter disregard for pre256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Dworkin, supra note 234.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Seh. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753.
Dworkin, supra note 234.
Chemerinsky, supra note 255, at 427.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2003).
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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cedent. 2 65 Justice Ginsburg, dissenting on behalf of the centrist bloc,
protested:
Retreating from prior rulings that abortion restrictions cannot be imposed absent an exception safeguarding a woman's health, the Court
upholds an Act that surely would not survive under the close scrutiny
that previously attended state-decreed limitations on a woman's reproductive choices.2 66
These two cases are vivid examples that the Roberts majority is pursuing a policy agenda hostile to civil rights.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, given the life tenure of Supreme Court Justices, it
will not be easy to restore the civil rights guarantees eroded by these
decisions. Advocates need to beware of the substantial threat to civil
rights posed by the Roberts Court.
It is certainly possible for Congress to take significant steps to restore civil rights, enacting legislation to strengthen civil rights laws:
expanding definitions of individuals impacted by laws, improving and
expanding private rights of action, and superseding erroneous Supreme Court interpretations of legislative intent. Since the Supreme
Court has limited Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, it may be more effective for future legislation to condition federal funds on states' compliance with policy objectives.26 7
Nevertheless, legislation should be drafted with the clear knowledge
that the Roberts Court will narrowly interpret statutes that protect
civil rights. For instance, the Court is likely to dismiss legislative history in the context of Spending Clause cases, and therefore simply
recording congressional intent in a congressional report is unlikely to
sway the interpretation of the statute by the Court. Also, legislation
that overrules prior precedent should specify that it applies to a wide
range of facts and is not intended to be limited only to the fact pattern
of the superseded case.
Litigation to enforce civil rights in the era of the Roberts Court will
definitely be challenging. Advocates should consult with regional and
national experts regarding which cases to appeal in this era of conservative courts, as well as how to frame jurisdictional claims to maximize the likelihood of overcoming procedural hurdles to court
access.2 68 For instance, preemption claims are an alternative form of
265.
BooKs,
266.
267.
268.
listserv

See Ronald Dworkin, The Court & Abortion: Worse Than You Think, N.Y. REV.
Vol. 54, No. 9 (May 31, 2007).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Kovalchick, supra note 251, at 112-13.
The Federal Rights Project of the National Senior Citizens Law Center maintains a
to inform public interest advocates of recent cases regarding access to court issues. For
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obtaining court access, in lieu of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for enforcement of
Spending Clause statutes. 269 As federal courts become more hostile

to civil rights litigants, counsel should consider whether state court
claims are likely to provide a more favorable result. For example,
consider third-party beneficiary claims under state law to enforce federal law against government contractors.2 7 °
Finally, advocates should increase and improve communications to
the general, non-legal media to improve public awareness of the

Court's campaign to undercut civil rights. Public interest groups
should work to facilitate widespread, grassroots protest of the further

erosion of civil rights by the courts. These issues need to be translated
from arcane legal terminology to accessible language that can galva-

nize public support for statutes that promote justice and equality for
all.

more information, see the federal rights page at www.nsclc.org. There are many other national
organizations that also provide advice to litigators, for instance, the National Health Law Program, the Center for Medicare Advocacy, and the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law.
These examples do not attempt to list the numerous groups supporting civil rights and safety net
litigation.
269. See David Sloss, ConstitutionalRemedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 355
(2004) (arguing that Supreme Court precedent requires recognition of an implied right of action
arising from the Supremacy Clause to enforce federal statutes against violating states); Lauren
Saunders, Preemption as an Alternative to Section 1983, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 705 (2005)
(discussing how a preemption cause of action can be employed by public interest lawyers). See
also Jane Perkins, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Federal Laws, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 720
(2005) (discussing challenges of litigating under section 1983).
270. See, e.g., Brown v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Tenn. 2007)
(approving third-party contract claim against nursing home in absence of right of action under
Medicare and Medicaid Acts); Steve Hitov & Gill Deford, The Impact of Privatizationon Litigation, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 590, 590-97 (2002) (discussing third-party contract claims).
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